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State Succession in Respect
of Treaties and Notifications:
A Bottleneck Approach
Mr. Aymeric Hêche



Abstract:
Nowadays, State succession in respect of treaties is mainly concerned with
separation and dismemberment of States. According to the 1978 Vienna
Convention on the topic, the predecessor’s treaties automatically bind the
Successor State (article 34 of the said Convention). In practice, successor
States are not officially bound until they issue a notification of succession.
Except upon submission of a notification, the depositary does not list the
Successor State as a party. The scope of this article is to highlight the central
position of notifications in the succession process. Given the major role
played by notifications, it is worth questioning notifications themselves. The
article thus addresses many issues: what is a notification? What are the
theoretical considerations pertaining to them? How do successor States use
notifications? Is treaty law relevant to notifications of succession? Are
notifications governed by customary law? How are notifications perceived by
successor States, depositaries, and other States parties? Here are some of
the questions we will tentatively try to answer. All these questions (and
answers) will help to build a more accurate representation of notifications
and of State succession in respect of treaties. In the end, we will be able to
outline the characteristics features of notifications of succession. By doing so,
analytical tools useful to appraise future notifications of succession, as well
as succession of States in respect of treaties at large, will be provided.
1.

A few words about the title and structure

The present article tackles State succession in respect of treaties from the
perspective of notifications of succession. This article was also inspired by the
work of B. Stern’s thorough analysis of notifications(1). The word “bottleneck”
refers to the central position of notifications in the process of State succession.
 Assistant- Doctorant (Université de Neuchâtel.(
(1) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 268-295.
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Standing at the crossroad of successor States, depositaries, and other States
parties, notifications may provide a valuable insight into the issue of State
succession in respect of treaties and guide us through this judicial maze.
This article begins with an assessment of notifications listed in the 1978
topical Convention on succession of States in respect of treaties. Given the
limits of this Convention, the subsequent two sections (4 and 5) are separately
devoted to the theory and practice of notifications, before combining them in
section 6. In section 7, the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties is
confronted with notifications of succession. Sections 8 and 9 illustrate different
perspectives in order to give an exhaustive view of notifications. The
conclusion highlights the main features of this article (section 10).
2.

Introduction

State succession in respect of treaties is a technical, obscure, and complex
field of international law. The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States
in respect of Treaties(2) (henceforth: “VCST”) defines succession as “the
replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international
relations of territory” (article 2, §1, lit. b) VCST). The VCST’s main purpose is to
govern(3) the transmission of treaties between the predecessor and
successor(s) State(s). In accordance with the res inter alios acta principle, the
VCST only applies to the twenty-two contracting States(4). Part three of the
VCST (articles 16 to 30) deals with the now (almost)(5) outdated category of
(2) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1946, p. 3 (available online:
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf).
The VCST opened for signature in August 1978 and only entered into force in 1996. As of 2017,
it binds twenty-two States.
(3) At the time of its inception, the VCST was a mix of codification and progressive
development. For an assessment of the VCST results, see: A. Zimmermann, “La Convention de
Vienne sur la succession d’Etats en matière de traités: codification réussie ou échouée?”, in: G.
Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur la succession d’Etats en matière de
traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 1547-1575. In a more radical tone: A. Sarvarian, “Codifying
the Law of State Succession: A Futile Endeavour?”, 27 EJIL (2016), 789-812.
(4) Article 7 VCST, which provides for an “anticipated application” of the Convention’s
provisions, allows to some extent to overcome this issue (A.P. Kaboré, “Article 7”, in: G.
Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur la succession d’Etats en matière de
traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 227-259. Slovakia and the Czech Republic made such a
declaration, see the webpage of the VCST on the UN Treaty Collections website:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=23&subid=A&clang=_en.
(5) New Caledonia, as of now part of France, is expected to vote on its status by the end of
2018. For further details, one can consult the United Nations page dedicated to non-selfgoverning territories (http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml) and
General assembly resolution 1514 (14 December 1960).
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“newly independent states”. Outside the decolonisation process, Part four of
the VCST covers the unification and separation of States (articles 31 to 38). This
article focuses on the separation of States, and more specifically on the
notifications issued by successor States.
State succession being an intricate topic, the notions of “separation” and
“notification” require further clarification.
A “separation” can lead to different outcomes, depending on whether the
Predecessor State still exists after the succession. If the predecessor retains its
identity after the succession(6), it is a “separation” (e.g. Sudan and South
Sudan); if the predecessor disappears, it is a “dismemberment” (e.g.
Czechoslovakia, Ex-Yugoslavia). This difference is important since the
transmission of treaties involves only the Successor State(7). According to
article 34 VCST, the succession is automatic: “any treaty in force at the date of
the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the Predecessor
State continues in force in respect of each Successor State so formed”, leaving
little room for discontinuance of the predecessor’s obligations(8). Nowadays(9),

(6) Concerning the issue of State identity and continuity, see M.C.R. Craven, “The Problem of
State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law”, 9 EJIL (1998), 142-162.
(7) The situation of the Predecessor State is the same as before the succession: old treaties still
apply to him (article 35 VCST). This rule is deemed as a codification: V. Mikulka, “Article 35”, in:
G. Distefano et al. (ed.), op. cit. supra, 1223-1224.
(8) Article 34, §2 provides for two safeguard clauses (found in many other provisions of the
VCST, e.g. articles 15, 17, 18, 19, 36, 37, …) :
“Succession of States in cases of separation of parts of a State
1.When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or more States, whether
or not the predecessor State continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of
the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each successor State so formed;
(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect only of that part of the
territory of the predecessor State which has become a successor State continues in force in
respect of that successor State alone.
2.Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; or
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application of the treaty in
respect of the successor State would be incompatible” (italics added).
(9) The International Law Commission, basing itself on customary law, first arranged a different
regime for “separation” (application of the clean slate principle) and “dismemberment”
(automatic succession). Z. Mériboute, La codification de la succession d’Etats aux traités, Paris,
Puf (1984), 157-159; V. Mikulka, “Article 34”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra, 1160-1161; P.
Dumberry, D. Turp, “State Succession with Respect to Multilateral Treaties in the Context of
Secession”, 13 Baltic Yearbook of International Law (2013), 40. To some extent, this difference
is still relevant: as of early 2017, South Sudan broke apart from Sudan and did not issue a
general declaration on succession (this means that South Sudan applied the clean slate
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the rule of “automatic succession” is seen as part of customary law (10), or at
least amounting to a strong presumption(11). Thus, all treaties binding the
Predecessor State on the date of succession become binding for the successor.
Let us now briefly look at “notifications” before establishing the link with
“automatic succession”.
Restrictively defined, a “notification” is a declaration aiming to inform
another State (or another subject of international law, such as an international
organization) of a fact or an act(12). Article 38 VCST provides for “notification”,
but it regards treaties not yet in force at the time of succession (article 36
VCST); hence confirming that article 34 VCST does not need the performance
of an additional notification. An ubiquitous issue of notification is the
form/substance conflation. Strictly speaking, a true notification relates both to
the form of the declaration and its content (a declaration, usually in writing,
issued in order to make another State aware of a fact, or action). Broadly
speaking – and the confusion is easy and not uncommon – “notification” is
used to refer only to the form of a unilateral declaration, regardless of its
content, nor true nature.
In the utmost doctrinal tradition(13), notification is but one of the five
unilateral juridical acts. The others are: recognition, waiver(14), protest and
promise. Keeping in mind the possible confusion on the form/substance of

principle). See: P. Dumberry, D. Turp, “State Succession with Respect to Multilateral Treaties in
the Context of Secession”, 13 Baltic Yearbook of International Law (2013), 61.
(10) A. Zimmermann, “La Convention de Vienne sur la succession d’Etats en matière de traités:
codification réussie ou échouée ?”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra, 1564-1565 (“the principle of
continuity is beginning to prevail”); V Mikulka, “Article 34”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra,
1196-1197. Against the customary rule, and relating to the succession to humanitarian and
human rights treaties: M. Belkahla, “La succession d’Etats en matière de traités multilatéraux
relatifs aux droits de l’homme”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra, 1701-1702.
(11) According to P. Dumberry and D. Turp, a presumption of continuity should be applied to
cases of secession (“State Succession with Respect to Multilateral Treaties in the Context of
Secession”, 13 Baltic Yearbook of International Law (2013), 62).
(12) E. Kassoti, The Juridical Nature of Unilateral Juridical Acts, Leiden, Brill (2015), 38; M. F.
Dominick, “Notification”, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.
3, Elsevier (1997), 695: “Notification is a formal, unilateral act in international law, by a State
informing other States or organizations of legally relevant facts”.
(13) E. Kassoti, the Juridical Nature of Unilateral Juridical Acts, Leiden, Brill (2015), 34-42:
“[T]he literature largely agrees that the main types of unilateral acts include recognition,
protest, promise, waiver or renunciation and notification”.
(14) Also known as “renunciation”.
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notifications, it is important to mark that anything (for instance a recognition,
or a promise) can be communicated through the medium of a notification(15).
How is the connection between State succession and notification made? In
the context of State succession, notifications are being used by successor
States to communicate their will, or sometimes their sense of obligation, to
succeed to their predecessor’s obligations. These notifications are addressed
to various treaty depositaries, the most important of which being, by far, the
UN Secretary-General. The content of these notifications is generally twofold:
(1) the successor announces its will to be part to the treaties of the
predecessor and (2) joins a list of treaties subject to succession (16). Although
the clear-cut rule of article 34 does not mention the need to submit a
notification, the practice of separating States shows that some of them have
submitted such notifications to the UN Secretary-General in its capacity of
depositary(17).
For the sake of consistency of terminology, we have to distinguish between
“general” and “specific” notifications of succession. “General notifications” are
characterised by a statement of the successor State (date of succession,
decision to subject treaties to succession, etc.) and of a list of treaties to
succeed to. This general notification is addressed to the depositary. On the
other hand, “specific notifications” operate on a treaty-by-treaty basis: there
are as many notifications as there are treaties subjected to succession.
In the next pages we will analyse more closely notifications in the context of
State succession.
3. Notifications of succession in the ambit of the Vienna Convention on
the Succession of States in respect of treaties
“Notification of succession” is defined in article 2, lit. g) VCST: “[it] means in
relation to a multilateral treaty any notification, however phrased or named,
made by a successor State expressing its consent to be considered as bound by
the treaty”. Article 38, which is the direct homologous to article 22, does not
use the words “notification of succession”, but only provides for “notification”.

(15) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 199-200.
(16) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 283-284.
(17) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 283.
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The ILC made this choice to highlight the difference(18) between the succession
paradigm of part three(19) and four of the VCST. It can reasonably be argued
that the definition of article 2, lit. g) VCST does not apply to part four of the
Convention.
As mentioned in the introduction, the VCST does not provide for a
notification in case of succession to treaties already in force at the date of
separation of States (article 34). Hence, the notifications relating to treaties
already in force fall outside the scope of the VCST. This means that their effects
are not regulated by the VCST, but by general international law (customary
law) or specific provisions of the treaty subjected to succession when it
provides for it.
Upon closer scrutiny, a distinction is necessary. General notifications are
twofold. 1) Public international law governs the “statement” part where the
State makes public its intention regarding the compact of treaty of the
Predecessor State(20). 2) The “annexed list” part where the State gives a list of
treaties it wants to subject to succession is governed by each specific treaty (21)
(but given that most of them do not provide for articles regarding succession,
public international law is therefore applicable)(22). For example, here are the
relevant parts of the general notification issued by Montenegro and addressed
to the UN Secretary-General:

(18) ILC, “Report of the commission to the General Assembly”, 1974 YBILC vol. II(1), 267, §1.
Initially, the commission wanted to use the word “notice”, but since it had no adequate
translation in French, it decided to use “notification” (ILC, “Summary record of the 1296th
meeting”, 1974 YBILC vol. I, 262, §44).
(19) Articles 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 30 refer to “notification of succession”.
(20) United Nations, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of
Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, 90-91, §303-307 (“The secretary
general […] does not consider such a declaration as a valid instrument of succession to any of
the treaties deposited with him”, §303).
(21) United Nations, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of
Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, 88, §294-296; ICRC, Commentary
on the First Geneva Convention (2016), article 60, §3217: “The subject of succession is covered
neither by the final provisions of the Conventions nor by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties”. With regards to succession to constituent documents of international
organization, a specific rule is provided for in article 4 of the VCST.
(22) United Nations, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of
Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, 89, §297-301: “In the absence of
provisions which set specific conditions for succession or which otherwise restrict succession,
the Secretary-General is guided by the participation clauses of the treaties”. “Participation
clauses” relate to accession, signature, and ratification of treaties.

66

[Year 33, Issue No. 77 January 2019]

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2019/iss77/9

]

6

Hêche: ????? ????? ???? ????? ?????????? ??????????: ??? ????????

[State Succession in Respect of Treaties and Notifications: A Bottleneck Approach]
“[The Government of]…the Republic of Montenegro decided to succeed to
the treaties to which the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was a party or
signatory.
[The Government of]…the Republic of Montenegro succeeds to the treaties
listed in the attached Annex and undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out
the stipulations therein contained as from June 3rd 2006, which is the date the
Republic of Montenegro assumed responsibility for its international relations
and the Parliament of Montenegro adopted the Declaration of
Independence.”(23)
The first paragraph announces the intention of Montenegro. It is a general
statement notifying the choice (“decided to succeed”) made at the national
level (parliament of Montenegro).
The second paragraph is operational, the general intention previously
stated produces effects only toward the treaties listed in the annex. Practically,
it entrusts the depositary (here, the UN Secretary-General) to add Montenegro
as a State party in respect of the treaties subjected to succession.
Article 22 of the VCST (labelled “notification of succession”) codifies the
practice that first originated in the context of decolonisation (24). These
notifications are commonly accepted, and, as the Summary of practice of the
Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties puts it, the two basic
conditions are that the treaty was already in force at the date of succession,
and that the notification comes from a State(25). A vague declaration of
succession is not sufficient; a specific list of treaties is required (26). Notifications
have been used in the case of separation of States, beyond the ambit of the
1978 Convention(27).

(23) Website of the United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretaryGeneral, Historical Information (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr).
Italics added.
(24) G. Korontzis, “Article 22”, in: G. Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur
la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 800, “nous pouvons dire
que le mécanisme largement procédural de l’article 22 repose sur une solide pratique
dépositaire qui existait bien avant l’élaboration de l’article”.
(25) United Nations, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of
Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, 89, §299.
(26) G. Korontzis, “Article 22”, in: G. Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur
la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 802.
(27) A. Alì, “Article 38”, in: G. Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur la
succession d’Etats en matière de traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 1297.
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According to the automatic succession principle enshrined in article 34, one
can legitimately wonder what the effect of a notification of succession is (28). Is
it only declaratory and used to confirm an automatic succession? Is it
constitutive and a necessary step for the State to become a party to a treaty?
G. Korontzis clearly points towards a constitutive effect(29). B. Stern adopts a
balanced and sophisticated opinion: the succession to the predecessor’s
treaties is mandatory; hence, the notification of succession assumes only a
declaratory effect although necessary in order to create a contractual link with
the other States parties(30). This question can be left unanswered: with or
without a constitutive effect, notifications are a huge help to legal certainty (31).
Notifications have the advantage of giving a list of treaties, the depositary can
act accordingly (as for now, depositaries do not change the status of treaties in
the absence of a specific notification), and the other States parties are aware
of the succession.
To sum up, the practice of notifications of succession is at variance with the
clear texts of articles 34 and 38 VCST. Notwithstanding this contradiction,
notifications are deemed necessary in order to establish a contractual link with
other States parties(32). Without a specific notification, the depositary does not
register the Successor State as a party. The practice of notifications of
succession has developed outside of the VCST’s framework.
4.

The theoretical framework

The VCST does not address notifications of succession for treaties already in
force (part four of the VCST). We will thus focus on the general theoretical
framework that applies to notifications in order to grasp the category of
“notifications of succession”.
(28) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 293.
(29) G. Korontzis, “Article 22”, in: G. Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur
la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 804, §19, and 805, §21.
According to him, notifications of succession pertaining to part IV of the Convention
(separation of States) follow the same rules as to article 22 in the part III dedicated to
decolonisation.
(30) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 293-294 (see the “second option”). In
other words: the successor State is under an obligation to subject treaties to succession, but it
has to do it itself. The depositary cannot do it without notification, and other States do not
benefit from a treaty until it has been subjected to succession.
(31) A. Alì, “Article 38”, in: G. Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne de 1978 sur la
succession d’Etats en matière de traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 1297.
(32) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 293-294; Summary of Practice of the
Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), 90-91, §306.
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“Notification” is one of the five traditional unilateral acts (promise, protest,
waiver, and recognition)(33). We are indebted to Giorgio Cansacchi for the most
thorough study on notifications(34). Sadly, this work dates back to 1943, long
before the wave of decolonisation, and there is no chapter expressly dealing
with notifications in the context of States succession. The book offers
nonetheless a great help since it lays out a rich and detailed theoretical
apparatus and provides analytical tools useful for examining notifications of
succession. We will introduce some of the classifications presented in the book
before we take a quick glance at the more recent doctrine.
What is “inside” a notification? This may both seems a strange way to frame
the question, and a pointless exercise. Nevertheless, G. Cansacchi teaches us
that a declaration of intention(35) or a representation of facts(36), are the two
main possible objects and contents of a notification(37). A declaration of
intention can be further distinguished whether it is or not subject to
reception(38). In a notification subject to reception, the intent to notify and the
intent contained therein is the same: the State wants to notify and it is only by
issuing a notification that its will is apt to produce an effect (39). In short, the
notification is a condition to the act performed (the State wants to perform an
act, the existence of which is conditional on a notification). According to G.
Cansacchi, accession to a treaty should be regarded as a notification subject to
reception(40). On the other hand, if the notified act exists independently from
its notification, the notification is not subject to reception (41). In this context, a
(33) E. Kassoti, the Juridical Nature of Unilateral Juridical Acts, Leiden, Brill (2015), 35 and 38.
(34) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 307p.
(35) On this category: G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di
politica internazionale (1943), 188-213.
(36) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 213-219.
(37) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 42. He also lists minor objects in a third, residual, category (encompassing notifications
of a tribunal’s decision, of a person, a thing or even the externalization of a “feeling”, e.g. a
formal apology).
(38) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 118-119.
(39) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 118-119.
(40) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 191.
(41) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 124.
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notification adds nothing to the “self-sustaining”, already-existing(42), act.
Unilateral juridical acts are instances of notifications not subject to
reception(43). Let us turn now to the other object, namely a “representation of
fact”. The notification contains and communicates a fact or a juridical
situation, for instance the occupation of a territory not belonging to any other
State(44). The ultimate goal of such a notification is to bring one’s own
perception of a situation to the attention of another State.
Another set of opposites are the compulsory and discretionary
notifications(45). Notification is compulsory when a treaty or a customary norm
imposes it, in that the notification is the way to fulfil an obligation (46). The
flagship obligation of the 1885 General Act of Berlin offers an easy to
understand example: without notification, the occupation was not deemed to
be effective and other States could claim that the territory was under their
control(47). Put differently, a notification is compulsory when a specific treaty
provision or customary norm creates and governs its effects. As suggested by
their name, discretionary notifications are not governed by a specific norm,
they belong to public international law and their effect is limited to the
“general principle of notification”(48), meaning that their purpose is only to

(42) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 198: “Ne consegue che la notificazione non ha tanto per oggetto la volontà negoziale
del dichiarante, quanto l’atto giuridico ormai perfetto nei suoi elementi”.
(43) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), respectively 200 and 207-208.
(44) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 42; A.P. Sereni, Diritto internazionale. Relazioni internazionali, vol. III, Milan, Giuffrè
(1962), 1357.
(45) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 40, in italian: “obbligatorie” (compulsory) and “facoltative” (discretionary).
(46) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 40-41.
(47) See article 34 of the 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference:
“Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African
continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such
possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate there,
shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other
Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any
claims of their own.” And G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di
politica internazionale (1943), 272-277 for a detailed analysis. Also: A.P. Sereni, Diritto
internazionale. Relazioni internazionali, vol. III, Milan, Giuffrè (1962), 1356.
(48) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 40.
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[State Succession in Respect of Treaties and Notifications: A Bottleneck Approach]
communicate a fact, or an act(49). Notifications of succession are not
compulsory on a treaty basis(50), but they may still be compulsory on a
customary basis pertaining to State succession. Seemingly this may not be the
case given that South Sudan and the successor States of the ex-U.S.S.R. did not
issue a general notification of succession(51).
Declaratory, or constituent, notifications regard the requirement to issue a
notification in order to produce juridical effects(52). When, save for a
notification, an act has no effect, we are facing a “constituent notification” (53).
If the content of the notification produces effects irrespective of the issue of a
notification, it is declaratory(54). Declaratory notifications are knowledgeoriented. Their purpose is to inform another State of an act, or an already
existing fact. On the other hand, constituent notifications are an integral (and
final) part of a larger process. Absent the notification, the process is
incomplete and ineffective: G. Cansacchi gives the example of a notification of
accession to a treaty(55). In this respect it is interesting to notice that the
International Red Cross Committee classifies notifications of succession as an
accession(56).
(49) Therefore, the notifying State cannot contradict itself, and the notified State cannot
pretend not to be aware of the content of the notification (G. Cansacchi, La notificazione
internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (1943), 38).
(50) Since the VCST only asks for notifications if the treaty was not yet in force (article 38 VCST
read together with article 36).
(51) The following hypothesis cannot be excluded: 1) the customary norm requiring a
notification crystallised with the breakup of Yugoslavia. 2) The customary norm only relates to
notifications regarding each specific treaty. 3) It could also be argued that the conduct of South
Sudan is wrongful and engages its responsibility as long as it does not issue a general
notification (see, infra, note n°114 on the last hypothesis).
(52) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 42: respectively “non costitutive/declaratorie” and “costitutive” in Italian.
(53) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 42 (“Sono notificazioni costitutive le notificazioni aventi per oggetto dichiarazioni di
volontà o rappresentazioni di fatti, relativamente alle quali il procedimento notificativo è
necessario affinchè la manifestazione di volontà o il fatto, oggetti di notifica, producano i
proprii effetti giuridici”).
(54) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 43: “Sono, invece, notificazioni non costitutive (o declaratorie) le notificazioni di
dichiarazioni di volontà o di rappresentazioni di fatti, relativemente alle qualli il procedimento
notificativo non è necessario al fine di far nascere gli effeti giuridici che la manifestazione di
volontà od il fatto producono”.
(55) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale
(1943), 43.
(56) ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, at article 60. Available online
(https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions).
The
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More recent theories and classifications of notifications are briefly surveyed
hereafter:
Dupuy follows a threefold distinction for unilateral acts: 1) the ones
pertaining to the opposability of a juridical situation (57), 2) the ones by which
States exercise a sovereign right(58), 3) the ones by which States create legal
commitments(59). Notifications fit better in the third category if we consider
that they are constitutive.
According to Crawford: “[i]t seems that while a bare (unaccepted)
declaration may be valid, it can produce its intended effects only if accepted
(expressly or implicitly)”(60). A distinction between the validity (non-subject to
reception) and the effects of the unilateral act is thus drawn. The effects come
into being only if other States rely on the declaration.
Pellet and Daillier distinguish between “autonomous” and “nonautonomous” unilateral acts. Acts are “autonomous” if their validity is not
based on the provisions of a treaty or on a customary norm (61). According to
them, notifications satisfy this criterion. We believe that not all notifications
fall within this category: a quick reference to the 1885 General Act of the Berlin
Conference should be enough to evidence it(62). In addition, unilateral acts can
either bind the State issuing a notification, or also bind third States(63).
Unilateral acts have the power to bind third States mainly when they are “nonautonomous”(64): for instance a notification may bind other States parties if
this is consistent with the provisions of the treaty.
Still on the question of “autonomous” acts, it is worth quoting Kassoti: “[The
autonomous acts category] applies to unilateral acts that, although having
legal effects on the international plane, are not elements of the treaty or
commentary is written by the ICRC, though Switzerland is the depositary of the Geneva
Conventions.
(57) P.-M. Dupuy, Droit International Public, 9th ed., Paris, Dalloz (2008), 366, §344.
(58) P.-M. Dupuy, Droit International Public, 9th ed., Paris, Dalloz (2008), 367, §345.
(59) P.-M. Dupuy, Droit International Public, 9th ed., Paris, Dalloz (2008), 367-368, §346.
(60) J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., Oxford, Oxford
University Press (2012), 417.
(61) N. Quoc Dinh, et al., Droit International Public, 5th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (1994), 354-355,
§242.
(62) See article 34 of the 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference and the footnote n°47
supra.
(63) In French, the words “autonormateur” and “hétéronormateur” are respectively used, we
did not find an adequate translation: N. Quoc Dinh, et al., Droit International Public, 5th ed.,
Paris, L.G.D.J. (1994), 357-359, §244-245.
(64) N. Quoc Dinh, et al., Droit International Public, 5th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (1994), 359, §245.
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custom-forming processes. Therefore, such acts will have to be evaluated
within the sub-system of international law in which they occur”(65). How do
notifications of succession fit in this respect? They are not elements of the
VCST, but they may be linked to the treaty subjected to succession(66). General
notifications of succession can also be part of the custom-forming process:
they constitute practice, and evidence opinio iuris depending on the way they
are formulated(67). Based on this quote, the last option is to see notifications of
succession as an autonomous act pertaining to the sub-system of State
succession.
Finally, we turn to the handbook of Combacau and Sur: unilateral acts are of
immediate or incidental effect(68). This largely overlaps with the
“autonomous”/“non-autonomous” divide seen before(69). Although, a single
quote from this handbook may enlighten notifications: “[The effects] sont
indirects lorsque les actes unilatéraux contribuent à la formation de règles
coutumières, ou attestent leur existence, voire sont utilisés comme éléments
pour constituer des principes généraux de droit”(70). Notifications of succession
referring to “valid principles of international law”, or to “customary
international law” may be ascribed to the category of non-autonomous acts.
Within the “autonomous” category, the authors further distinguish between
unilateral acts that create rights or obligations for third States (71). When they
create obligation, the consent (even implied or tacit) of the third State is
required. Depending on whether we view the automatic succession of article
34 VCST as customary or not, notifications only confirm the already existing
legal obligations, or create new ones burdening the successor State
(notifications as promise), and third States as well.
(65) E. Kassoti, the Juridical Nature of Unilateral Juridical Acts, Leiden, Brill (2015), 51.
(66) If notifications of succession to a specific treaty are akin to accession or ratifications, they
are non-autonomous (Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of
Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), 90, §304; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva
Convention (2016), article 60, see section 4 on “succession”). Accession and ratifications are
examples of non-autonomous acts.
(67) Especially when words like “valid principles of international law”, or “customary law” are
used.
(68) J. Combacau, S. Sur, Droit International Public, 11th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (2014), 96.
(69) J. Combacau, S. Sur, Droit International Public, 11th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (2014), 97-99.
(70) J. Combacau, S. Sur, Droit International Public, 11th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (2014), 96. This
quote can be roughly translated: “They are indirect [or “incidental”] when unilateral acts
contribute to the formation of customary rules, or attest their existence, or are even used as
elements to constitute general principles of law”. Italics added.
(71) J. Combacau, S. Sur, Droit International Public, 11th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (2014), 99.
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Now that the theoretical net is sketched, we will first present the practice of
notifications, and then tentatively try to cast it on a notification of succession.
5.

The practice

The dismemberment of the U.S.S.R. (1992), the breakup of Yugoslavia
(1991-2), the end of Czechoslovakia (1993), and the two more recent cases of
separation of Montenegro (2006), and South Sudan (2011) provide the bulk of
practice. Notifications of succession are just the tip of the iceberg: they appear
on the international level but they are sometimes the execution of a decision
(often pertaining to the legislative branch) made at the national level (72). Given
that “from the standpoint of International Law […] municipal laws are merely
facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same
manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures”(73), we will not deal
with the various acts relating to succession to treaties at the national level
(constitutional provisions, declaration by parliament, policy statement, etc.).
Nonetheless it must be specified that: 1) what is decided at the national level
may become relevant, but only to the extent that it falls under the scope of
public international law, and 2) national parliament debates and their
outcomes(74) may indicate opinio iuris in relation to State succession in respect
of treaties.
Broadly speaking, and for analysis purposes, the practice ranging from 1991
to 2011 can be split into three groups. In the first group, the successor States
issue a general notification of succession. The second group puts together
States which choose for or against issuing a general notification (the second
group is thus of a “mixed nature”). In the third one, the successor States do not
issue a general notification, neither a list of treaties; they notify their intention
to participate through the medium of succession, on a treaty-by-treaty basis
(specific notifications). In the first group, it is as if the general notification
(72) See the national declarations (then echoed at the international level in the notifications
sent to depositaries), made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
and by Croatia, B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 246-248.
(73) Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), Permanent Court of International
Justice, award of May 25th 1926, Series A, n° 7, 19.
(74) By enacting a national law relating to State succession in respect of treaties, national
parliaments act in two capacities: they are acting in their “usual” legislative role and they show
what they consider international law (opinio iuris). In a similar fashion, it reminds of the
expression “théorie du dédoublement fonctionnel” (plurality of functions’ theory) coined by
Georges Scelle (“Théorie et pratique de la fonction exécutive en droit international”, 55 RCADI
(1936-I), 99-100).
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[State Succession in Respect of Treaties and Notifications: A Bottleneck Approach]
serves as a rope holding the bundle of treaties subjected to succession; in the
third group there are as many notifications as the number of treaties subjected
to succession.
Based on the United Nations website, here is a chart summing up the main
features of notifications in the three groups:
First group: general notification and list of treaties
Czechoslovakia (1993, dissolution of States)
The Czech Republic and Slovakia are Both States choose to apply the VCST
the successor States. 221 multilateral to their own succession even if it was
treaties (and more than 500 bilateral not in force at the time(76).
treaties) were binding on the
predecessor State(75).
Czech Republic

Succession
to
286
treaties(77)
(multilateral and bilateral).

Text of the notification:

“In conformity with the valid
principles of international law and to
the extent defined by it, the Czech
Republic, as a successor State to the

(75) The number of multilateral treaties binding at the date of succession is based on the
search tools available on the website of the UN. For example, the following search boxes were
selected for Czechoslovakia: “Treaty / Participant / Czechoslovakia” together with
“Treaty / Treaty Type / Open Multilateral”, see: http://tinyurl.com/UNsearchadvanced.
(76) They made a declaration following article 7, §2 of the VCST: “A successor State may, at the
time of expressing its consent to be bound by the present Convention or at any time
thereafter, make a declaration that it will apply the provisions of the Convention in respect of
its own succession of States which has occurred before the entry into force of the Convention
in relation to any other contracting State or State Party to the Convention which makes a
declaration accepting the declaration, of the successor State”. For example, the declaration of
Slovakia reads as follow: “The Slovak Republic declares, under article 7, paragraphs 2 and 3 of
[the said] Convention, that it will apply the provisions of the Convention in respect of its own
succession which has occurred before the entry into force of the Convention in relation to any
signatory State (paragraph 3), contracting State or State Party (paragraphs 2 and 3) which
makes a declaration accepting the declaration of the successor State” (United Nations, Treaty
Collection Website, “Depositary” Tab, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXIII, cover page of the VCST,
http://tinyurl.com/VCST1978).
(77) We confine ourselves to the practice of the United Nations as a depositary. The
notifications are those available on the website. The number of treaties succeeded to is based
on the search tools of the UN website. For example, the following search boxes were selected
for the Czech Republic: “Action / Type of Action / Succession” together with
“Action / Participant / Czech Republic”, see: http://tinyurl.com/UNsearchadvanced.
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Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,
considers itself bound, as of 1 January
1993, […] by multilateral international
treaties”(78).
Slovakia

Succession
to
265
(multilateral and bilateral).

treaties

Text of the notification:

“In accordance with the relevant
principles and rules of international
law and to the extent defined by it,
the Slovak Republic, as a successor
State, born from the dissolution of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republics,
considers itself bound, as of January 1,
1993, […] by multilateral treaties”(79).

Serbia and Montenegro (2006, separation of States: Serbia is the continuator).
As the Constitution provided for,
Montenegro had the right to break
apart from Serbia(80). 350 multilateral
treaties were binding on the
predecessor State.

The VCST was already in force at the
date of succession. Montenegro
became a party to 343 multilateral
treaties.

Text of the notification:

“[The Government of] the Republic of
Montenegro decided to succeed to
the treaties to which the State Union
of Serbia and Montenegro was a party
[…]. [The Government of] the Republic
of Montenegro succeeds to the
treaties listed in the attached Annex
and undertakes faithfully to perform

(78) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information.
(79) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information.
(80) Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro of February 4th, 2003.
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and carry out the stipulations therein
contained”(81).
Second group: mixed nature (with or without general notifications)
Ex-Yugoslavia (1991-2, dissolution of States)(82)
After initial doubts on the status of
Serbia and Montenegro (successor or
continuator), all States were deemed
successors, namely Serbia and
Montenegro (called “Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia” until 2003), Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia,
and Croatia. 224 multilateral treaties
were binding on the predecessor
State.

The VCST was not yet in force at that
time and although no successor State
availed itself to use the anticipated
application mechanism of article 7, §2,
VCST, the succession medium was
widely used among the new States.
Between the five successor States, the
aggregated total of treaties entered
into effect through succession
amounts to 903.

Bosnia and Herzegovina(83).

No general notification, neither a list
of treaties, but a bundle of specific
notifications(84). Bosnia succeeded to
180 treaties.

Former
Yugoslav
Macedonia

Republic

of Succession to 155 treaties (by way of
specific notifications in 1991).

General Notification

Yes, but only in 2007.

List of treaties

No (it is unclear whether the 2007
general notification contains a list of
treaties or is merely referring to

(81) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information.
(82) For a detailed analysis and text of notifications outside the UN, see: B. Stern, “La
succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 246-249.
(83) Bosnia addressed a general notification to the UNESCO, but not to the UN, see: B. Stern,
“La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 248 (the text specifies that, in conformity with
international law, Bosnia considers to be bound by international treaties).
(84) “The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina deposited with the Secretary-General
notifications of succession to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to various treaties
[…]” (Website of the United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretaryGeneral, Historical Information (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_en).
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specific notifications issued in 1991).
“En application des principes et
normes du droit international, la
République de Macédoine, […] se
considère comme juridiquement liée
depuis le 17 novembre 1991 […] par
les traités multilatéraux auxquels la
République socialiste fédérative de
Yougoslavie était partie.
Text of the notification(85)

[…] La République de Macédoine
reconnaît donc, en principe, la
continuité des droits et obligations
conventionnels découlant des traités
internationaux
conclus
par
la
République socialiste fédérative de
Yougoslavie avant le 17 novembre
1991,
mais
comme
il
est
vraisemblable que certains traités
sont devenus caducs ou obsolètes,
chacun fera l’objet d'un examen
juridique puis d’une notification.”(86)

Serbia and Montenegro

Succession to 202 treaties

General notification:

Yes

List of treaties:

Yes

Text of the notification:

“[T]he Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, succeeds to
the
[treaties]
and undertakes
faithfully to perform and carry out the
stipulations therein contained”(87).

(85) Only available in French on the website of the UN
(https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr).
(86) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information (French version).
(87) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information.
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Croatia

Succession to 184 treaties

General notification:

Yes

List of treaties:

Yes

Text of the notification:

“[T]he Republic of Croatia has
decided, based on the Constitutional
Decision
on
Sovereignty
and
Independence of the Republic of
Croatia […] to be considered a party to
the conventions that Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and its
predecessor
states
[…]
were
(88)
parties” .

Slovenia

Succession to 182 treaties

General notification:

Yes

List of treaties:

Yes

Text of the notification:

“The Parliament of the Republic of
Slovenia
determined
that
international treaties […] remained
effective. […] This decision was taken
in consideration of customary
international law. […] The Republic of
Slovenia therefore in principle
acknowledges the continuity of treaty
rights and obligations under the
international treaties […] but since it is
likely that certain treaties may have
lapsed by the date of independence of
Slovenia or may be outdated, it seems

(88) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information.
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essential that each treaty be
subjected to legal examination”(89).
Third group: no general notifications
U.S.S.R. (1991, separation of States: Russia is deemed as the continuator)
Successor
States:
Armenia,
Azerbaijan,
Belarus,
Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan(90).
Around
233
multilateral treaties were binding on
the predecessor State.

At least 81 successions among the
many successor States, including
specialized UN agencies or States as
depositaries. On the other hand, it
seems that Azerbaijan, Moldova, and
Uzbekistan succeeded to one or no
treaties at all. There is no consistency
in the succession process: for the
same convention(91), accession was
sometimes
chosen
instead
of
(92)
notification of succession .

Sudan (2011, Sudan retains its identity)
South Sudan separated from Sudan in So far there is only one convention to
2011. 86 multilateral treaties were which South Sudan succeeded to(93), it
binding on the predecessor State.
chose accession for around 24 treaties
which were eligible for succession(94).
(89) United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical
Information.
(90) The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are not deemed successor States since
they were illegally annexed, they recovered their independence in 1991. J. Crawford, The
Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 393395; B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 244-246.
(91) For example: International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency;
Convention providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes; Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,… where only Belarus chose to notify its
succession, the other successor States preferred to accede, sometimes more than ten years
after the date of succession.
(92) B. Stern has an interesting take on this point. What matters to the automatic succession
rule is the end result (continuity in the predecessor’s treaties), not the formal procedure used
(accession or notification). B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996) 255.
(93) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2056, 211.
(94) Two remarks are also in order: 1) seven of the treaties are ILO Conventions, and 2) the
United Nations Convention against Torture, although relating to human rights, was accessed,
rather than subjected to succession. The number of twenty-four is based on a search by
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What emerges from this chart? Of the twenty successor States listed, seven
of them issued a general notification to the UN, the others chose to make
specific notifications. General notifications go with a conspicuous number of
treaties subjected to succession. Also of interest is that the two most
important cases, namely Ex-Yugoslavia and U.S.S.R., led to diametrically
opposed outcomes. A lot of treaties were subjected to succession in the
Yugoslavian case, and correlatively notifications were often used. Four out of
five successor States issued notifications in the Yugoslavian case, which marks
the starting point of the practice of general notifications outside the
decolonisation era decolonisation.
Another point that should not be overlooked: the words used in general
notifications. The interest is twofold: first, whether there is a difference
between bilateral and multilateral treaties, and, second, the wording indicates
what are the considerations underpinning the notification (choice to vest the
predecessor’s treaties or fulfilment of an obligation to subject them to
succession). The array of notifications range from neutral (Serbia and
Montenegro, Croatia, and Montenegro) to supportive (Slovenia, Macedonia,
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) towards automatic succession. The mirror
notifications of the Czech Republic and Slovakia take a stance against the
automaticity of succession to bilateral treaties since their perspective is that
the “valid principles of international law” relate only to multilateral treaties.
This position is strange on the count that both States consciously chose to
apply the VCST to their own succession(95), so article 34 VCST (that makes no
differences between multilateral and bilateral treaties)(96) should also apply.
From the depositary perspective, a clear statement is the trigger to register
a successor State as a party. In other words, the treaty concerned by the
notification must be distinctively identified(97). The UN practice shows that it
participants on the UN website (https://treaties.un.org/, tab “Registration and Publication”).
The search listed a total amount of twenty-eight treaties: three Constituent acts of
international organizations (regulated by article 4 VCST), as well as the 2015 Paris Climate
Agreement, are omitted.
(95) See the declaration following the provision of article 7, §2 of the VCST (United Nations,
Treaty Collection Website, “Depositary” Tab, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXIII, cover page of
the VCST, http://tinyurl.com/VCST1978).
(96) V. Mikulka, “Article 34”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra, 1179.
(97) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 283-284 (we draw the reader’s
attention to the fact that we depart from the definitions used by B. Stern concerning “specific”
and “general” notifications. For B. Stern, a general notification is a declaration of the intent to
succeed to the predecessor treaties without a list of annexed treaties. The Summary of
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does not matter whether the Successor State issued a bundle of specific
notifications or a general notification with a list of treaties(98).
The last strand of “practice” revolves around the attitude of other States
parties regarding a successor’s notification. For instance, when Slovenia
succeeded to the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances, the UN as a
depositary had to inform other States parties of Slovenia’s succession (99). This
communication from the depositary offers an opportunity to the other States
parties to express their potential objection to the succession. There is, so far,
no outstanding case of such an opposition to succession (100). However, this
“negative practice” of other States parties is not worthless. Given the huge
number of treaties subjected to succession from the nineties onward, the lack
of reaction by other States parties at least evidences that they consider
successor States entitled to succeed to their predecessor’s treaties(101).
At the most, the absence of reaction may be interpreted as an acceptance
of the principle of automatic succession enshrined in article 34 VCST (102).

Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), uses
the same definition as B. Stern, see 90, §305).
(98) Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New
York (1999), 90, §304: “The deposit of an instrument of succession results in having the
succeeding State become bound, in its own name, by the treaty to which the succession
applies, with exactly the same rights and obligations as if that State had ratified or acceded to,
or otherwise accepted, the treaty. Consequently, it has always been the position of the
Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary, to record a succeeding State as a party to a
given treaty solely on the basis of a formal document similar to instruments of ratification,
accession, etc.[…].”
(99) H. Tichy, P. Bittner, “Article 77”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 1319, §24; Summary of Practice of the SecretaryGeneral as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), 92, §311.
(100) V. Mikulka, “Article 34”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra, 1183. It is also difficult to
document these objections. In all the works read, we found only one case of opposition to a
succession, but the rationale behind it was that the treaty underwent a fundamental change of
circumstances, the principle of succession itself was not contested (article 34, §2 VCST). It was
also a bilateral treaty, less prone to succession, see: J. Klabbers, M. Koskenniemi, O. Ribbelink,
A. Zimmermann (ed.), State Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition,
Brill, 1999, 454 and 468. The few number of oppositions to succession are due to the fact that
the successor State reviews the predecessor treaties before submitting the list of treaties to
the depositary. The potential objections are thus avoided from the outset: V. Mikulka, “Article
34”, in: G. Distefano, op. cit. supra, 1183-1184. See also note n° 149.
(101) The successor “enjoys” the right: it is free to prefer adhesion (accession) to succession.
Regarding the silence of other States parties, opinio iuris may well be evidenced by a “negative
practice” (G.P. Buzzini, Le droit international général au travers et au-delà de la Coutume,
IHEID, Geneva (2007), 198-201).
(102) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 254-255 and 293-295.
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The practice of third States sometimes shows a reluctance to let the
successor State benefit from its predecessor’s bilateral treaties. Some States
claimed that the clean slate principle was therefore applicable in this
context(103).
6.

Theory and practice

This section aims to combine the theoretical framework (section 4) with the
practice of notifications (section 5). The purpose is to apply the theoretical
framework to notifications in order to answer a simple question: what is a
notification of succession worth? Is it mandatory in order to become party to a
treaty or is it merely informative in nature? Does the succession to a treaty
happen even in the absence of a notification? We are aware that we might end
up raising more issues than providing answers with the following analysis.
If deemed relevant, we will distinguish between specific and general
notifications (see the difference supra at the end of the introduction).
We have to keep in mind that the classifications offered by Cansacchi in
section 4 are independent from each other, they do not pile up (104). This
explains why the definitions sometimes overlap.
Do notifications of succession contain a “declaration of intention”, or a
“representation of fact”? The first possibility has to be further analysed,
depending on whether the State’s will must be notified in order to produce an
effect (respectively, notifications subject or not-subject to reception). Specific
notifications are clearly subject to reception since they produce effects only
when they are received by the depositary and the intent to notify may be
confused with the object of the notification. In this perspective, notifications of
succession are akin to a formal instrument of accession, or ratification(105).

(103) B. Stern, “La succession d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 264; G. Hafner, E. Kornfeind, “The
Recent Austrian Practice of State Succession: Does the Clean Slate Rule Still Exist?”, 1 Austrian
Review of International and European Law (1996) 1-49.
(104) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica
internazionale (1943), 37: “Le notificazioni che si compiono fra i soggetti di diritto
internazionale possono venire differenziate in base a differenti criteri”.
(105) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica
internazionale (1943), 191 (by analogy with accession); Summary of Practice of the SecretaryGeneral as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New York (1999), 90, §304; ICRC, Commentary
on the First Geneva Convention (2016), article 60, see section 4 on “succession”.
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If general notifications are re-conceptualized as “promises”, they are notsubject to reception(106). A promise is a kind of unilateral act that allows the
State to commit itself to do certain things or refrain from them(107). The
general notifications of Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Montenegro
match this description. For instance, Montenegro “decided to succeed to the
treaties” and “undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out the stipulations
therein contained”(108). Notification is the instrument used to communicate the
States’ will to succeed to the list of annexed treaties.
To some extent, general notifications where the Successor State
acknowledges “valid principles of international law” or takes “customary
international law”(109) into consideration may be re-conceptualised as a
“declaration of intention”. In this context, the Successor State declares and
recognises that rules relating to succession in respect of treaties exist, and that
these rules are binding.
Notifications containing “representation of fact” are independent of a
declaration of intention. They are focused on informing other States of a
situation that already happened. Interestingly, Cansacchi warns against
confusion of “representation of fact” with notifications “not-subject to
reception”, but upheld the distinction(110). General notifications from Croatia
and Slovenia are within this framework since they refer and communicate the
decision made at the national level (“The Parliament of the Republic of
Slovenia determined […]” and “[T]he Republic of Croatia has decided, based on
the Constitutional Decision on Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic
of Croatia […]”)(111). It is like the State availed itself of the right to succeed, and
then communicated its decision at the international level.

(106) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica
internazionale (1943), 200.
(107) The emblematic ICJ Nuclear Tests case offers an example (Nuclear Tests Case (New
Zealand v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, 472, §44).
(108) Website of the United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretaryGeneral, Historical Information (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr).
Italics added.
(109) Website of the United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretaryGeneral, Historical Information (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr).
See the following notifications: Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia.
(110) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica
internazionale (1943), 214.
(111) Website of the United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the SecretaryGeneral, Historical Information (https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr).
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We will now focus on the compulsory/discretionary divide. Notifications are
compulsory, notably if a right cannot be created without it (112). General
notifications of succession are compulsory in two scenarios: first, if a treaty
imposes them, and, second, if a customary norm imposes them. The VCST does
not impose notifications for treaties already in force. On the other hand, the
practice of the depositary (and especially the UN Secretary General) shows
that successor States do not automatically become party to their predecessor
treaties in the absence of a notification(113). This does not yet mean that
succession is mandatory, but only that specific or general notifications are a
prerequisite for depositaries. Ultimately, this depends on the customary
norm’s interpretation: is succession an option, or an obligation, for the
Successor State? If succession is an obligation, South Sudan’s absence of
notification would constitute an international wrongful act(114).
Discretionary notifications are limited to the communication of a fact or an
act, they are not regulated by a treaty or customary norms. As seen a few
paragraphs before, the general notifications of Slovenia and Croatia can fit in
this definition given that they mention decisions taken on the internal level(115).
The last “Cansacchian” set to confront with practice is the
declaratory/constituent notifications. Constituent notifications finalize a larger
process and allow the content of the notification to produce effects.
Declaratory notifications inform another State of an act or fact that already
exists. Specific notifications are clearly constituents; they are directed toward
the depositary alone and allow the State’s will to be implemented. It is more
Other examples relating to the breakup of Ex-Yugoslavia are listed in: B. Stern, “La succession
d’Etats”, 262 RCADI (1996), 246-248.
(112) G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi di politica
internazionale (1943), 41: “[Le notificazione sono obbligatorie] in quanto la mancata notifica
impedirebbe la nascita di un diritto soggettivo o lo stabilimento di una situazione giuridica
favorevole al notificante”.
(113) Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New
York (1999), 90, §304.
(114) Article 14, §2 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (Extension in time of the breach of an international obligation). This begs even more
questions: when is the obligation infringed? From the date of succession or after a reasonable
period of time? Does a notification with retroactive effects cure the unlawful conduct? Who
can invoke the wrongfulness (who is “wronged” by the absence of notification)? Only States
parties to treaties eligible for succession? And, in an overall thinking – and since the automatic
succession would be the rule in this context – why would notifications be mandatory in the
first place?
(115) See supra, the paragraph devoted to notifications of “representation of fact” in this
section.

[College of Law UAE University]

Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2019

85

25

Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2019, No. 77 [2019], Art. 9

[Mr. Aymeric Hêche]
difficult to classify general notifications: the part relating to the decision taken
internally or to the fact that the State is only observing international law is
declaratory in nature. On the other hand, the list of treaties annexed to the
general notification, or a phrase like “decide to succeed”, have a constituent
effect.
As a provisional conclusion, specific notifications tend to contradict the
automatic succession principle. General notifications are more complex.
Broadly speaking, the words used divide them between a declaration of
intention to succeed (as a freely exercised right) and the acknowledgment of
an international obligation (leaving little or no latitude). Respectively, these
two attitudes can be re-conceptualised as promises and notifications stricto
sensu (entirely oriented towards a mere communication of a situation).
Let us now turn to more recent classifications taught in handbooks and
treatises.
Interpreted as a promise, a general notification is an unilateral act that
creates legal commitments(116). Notification-promise negates the customary
nature of an automatic succession. Promises are self-sustaining (autonomous)
acts, they are valid once they exist and do not need anything else to produce
effects. The addressee of the promise is the UN Secretary-General, other States
parties to treaties listed in the annex are the beneficiaries. What is the
difference between a specific and a general notification? It seems that general
notifications formulated as promises to succeed to a list of treaties do not set
them apart from specific notifications issued for each treaty. The big difference
is that with a general notification, only one notification is issued, while in the
other case there are as many notifications as treaties.
Do notifications of succession need to be accepted to produce effects?(117) It
chiefly regards the notification’s addressees and beneficiaries. The addressee
is the depositary, other States parties are the beneficiaries. Do other States
“accept” the notification of succession? Upon reception of the notification, the
depositary informs other States parties(118). Public international law is non-

(116) P.-M. Dupuy, Droit International Public, 9th ed., Paris, Dalloz (2008), 367-368, §346.
(117) J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., Oxford, Oxford
University Press (2012), 417.
(118) Article 77, §1, lit. e), and lit. f) VCLT; H. Tichy, P. Bittner, “Article 77”, in: O. Dörr, K.
Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 1319,
§24.
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formalistic(119): acceptance need not to be in writing, or even express. Mere
silence works as an acceptance in this context(120). Silence from other States is
a constant in the field of successions. There is no outstanding instance of
opposition or objection to succession known to this day. At first sight, we may
conclude that States always accept the notification. Yet, at a closer look, this
silence may evidence the opinio iuris: States do not consider themselves
entitled to oppose a notification of succession. Be that as it may, it is important
to state that the acceptance here discussed would take place only in an
incidental way. The acceptance here discussed occurs between the depositary
and the other States parties (incidental acceptance). The acceptance does not
take place between the Successor State and the other States parties (direct
acceptance).
Notifications require acceptance mainly when they create obligations
binding third States(121) (in our case, the other States parties). Do notifications
create such obligations? It is possible to stretch the interpretation so that
notifications create obligations: once the succession to a treaty is accepted,
other States parties have to apply the provisions of the treaty in their relations
with the Successor State. By seeing notifications as burdening to other States,
we impliedly evaluate automatic successions as non-customary. Otherwise,
notifications would not need acceptance since they would only echo public
international law.
The last divide that requires our attention is the “autonomous”/“nonautonomous” one(122). We established that notifications of succession do not
fall within the ambit of the VCST. This does not yet mean that they satisfy the
“autonomy” criterion. Two tracks can be followed: 1) there is a customary
norm pertaining to the field of State succession that governs (general)
notifications(123). 2) There is a customary norm pertaining to the law of treaties
that govern notifications.
(119) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 11”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 153, §2.
(120) According to A. Cavaglieri (“Il decorso del tempo ed i suoi effetti sui rapporti giuridici
internazionali”, 5 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1926), 190-200), there is a strong
presumption that silence amounts to consent when notifications are mandatory (as is the case
in article 77 VCLT). See also: G. Cansacchi, La notificazione internazionale, Istituto per gli studi
di politica internazionale (1943), 286-287, §53.
(121) J. Combacau, S. Sur, Droit International Public, 11th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (2014), 99.
(122) It overlaps with the “compulsory”/“discretionary” distinction drawn by G. Cansacchi. See,
supra the relevant paragraph in The theoretical framework section.
(123) E. Kassoti, The Juridical Nature of Unilateral Juridical Acts, Leiden, Brill (2015), 51.
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1) This customary rule originates from the cases of Ex-Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia. From that point on, only Montenegro issued a general
notification of succession, and before this moment, there is no record of such a
practice for successor States outside the decolonisation process. Parallel to the
breakup of Yugoslavia, the succession process of the U.S.S.R. did not prompt
general notifications. South Sudan, on the other hand, would be at variance
with this customary norm. What would the content of the norm be? Would it
be mandatory in nature? Probably not, it would be dispositive in nature for
successor States (since in the end the depositary only needs a clear
notification, irrespective of general or specific). The obligation would primarily
bear on the other States parties and bar them from contesting the succession,
excepted if a safeguarding clause such as article 34, §2 VCST may apply. From a
content perspective, general notifications articulate themselves around two
axes: a statement enclosing the State’s opinion on its succession to treaties
(decision or obligation), and a list of treaties. Are seven cases of succession (124)
enough to create and consolidate a customary norm? We have to keep in mind
that State succession is not happening on a yearly basis. Montenegro would be
a “turning point” and a confirmation of the rule, and South Sudan would
constitute the first discrepancy. Up to now, only the notifications of four
States(125) are in line with an obligation compelling successor States to issue a
general notification. Others general notifications(126) are a promise, or
communicate a decision to succeed to treaties.
2) Article 73 VCLT expressly safeguards State succession in respect of
treaties(127). This means that the 1969 VCLT is subsidiary to the 1978 VCST. This
is theoretically quite nice, but of little use with regard to notifications since the
VCST does not provide any rules for notifications for treaties already in force at
the time of succession(128). We are thus pulled back to look into the VCLT,

(124) Ex-Yugoslavia (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia),
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia), and Montenegro.
(125) Slovenia, Macedonia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
(126) Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Montenegro.
(127) Article 73 VCLT: “The provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any
question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States or from the
international responsibility of a State or from the outbreak of hostilities between States.”
(128) Article 2, §1, lit. g) VCST provides that: “‘notification of succession’ means in relation to a
multilateral treaty any notification, however phrased or named, made by a successor State
expressing its consent to be considered as bound by the treaty”. The definition applies to
“notification of succession” within the ambit of the VCST, which is not our case here. For a
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which also does not provide any rule. However, the VCLT does not cover all of
treaty law; for instance it only applies to agreements recorded in writing (129).
Specific notifications may be akin to accession (article 15 VCLT) or ratification
(article 14 VCLT). They are seen as a “formal instrument” by the UN SecretaryGeneral(130) and are another means for States to commit themselves to a
treaty. What are the characteristics of “succession” as a formal instrument? 1)
It is only open to successor States for treaties already in force at the time of
succession. 2) It is a direct means to become part to a treaty (it does not need
another commitment, like signature needs ratification). 3) The Successor State
is retroactively bound since the date of succession(131). Overall, “succession”
could fit in the VCLT, it has emerged as a distinct way to become party to a
treaty. The UN as a depositary distinguishes between ratification, accession
and succession(132). These distinctions did not come about by accident and
make sense on the legal level. After the initial signature, a State is under no
obligation to ratify (it may even announces its will not to ratify)(133). Accession
allows non signatory States to become part to a treaty and have no retroactive
effect. Succession occurs on the date of independence. Ratification, accession,
and succession are clearly distinct from each other.
7.

Notifications of succession and the law of treaty

In accordance with the end of the previous section, “succession” would be
governed by a customary norm akin to those governing accession or
ratification (the “consent to be bound” category of instruments). It may be
fruitful to briefly investigate what the theoretical underpinnings of ratification
commentary, see L. Gradoni, “Article 2”, in: G. Distefano et al. (ed.), La Convention de Vienne
de 1978 sur la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2016), 120-122.
(129) Article 2, §1, lit. a) VCLT. K. Schmalenbach, “Article 2”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.),
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 34, §18-20.
(130) Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New
York (1999), 90, §304; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (2016), article 60,
see section 4 on “succession”.
(131) Even if the notification takes place ten or more years after the date of succession, see for
instance the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency cover
page on the UN website. Belarus notified its succession in 2001, with effect in 1991, and
Kazakhstan choose accession in 2010.
(132) See for instance the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
cover page on the UN website.
(133) O. Dörr, “Article 18”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 230, §28-29. See the end notes n° 9, 10 and 12 of Russia,
Sudan, and the United States of America pertaining to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (http://tinyurl.com/romestatute).
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and accession are within the VCLT. Articles 11 (means of expression of consent
to be bound), 14 (ratification), and 15 (accession) may be of interest in this
regard.
Article 11 lists the means of expression to be bound. Along ratification and
accession, it provides that “any other means if so agreed” can express such
consent. At first sight, the “any other means” formula is apt to encompass
succession. This perspective is very appealing, but also very likely mistaken.
According to Hoffmeister, the scope of “any other means” is:
“[To allow] for modern ways of expressing consent, which do not fall within
the traditional categories of signature, exchange of instruments constituting a
treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”(134)
Article 11 VCLT revolves around the initial consent to be bound, which
consent is geared toward the entry into force of a treaty. The “any other
means” formula offers flexibility to choose how the treaty will become binding.
We can thus draw a distinction between creating a means to express consent
prior to the inception of the treaty (article 11 VCLT), and after, as is a
notification of succession. The “other means” examples listed in the
commentary of article 11 do not cover expression of consent to be bound after
the inception of the treaty(135).
Ratification (article 14 VCLT) is a unilateral act(136). This corroborates the
potential reconceptualisation of notifications as promises(137).
One of the major problems with accession (article 15 VCLT) is whether a
treaty not providing accession clauses can be subsequently modified(138). Since
succession is hardly ever foreseen as a means to participate in a treaty,
accession and succession can be compared in this respect. Article 15, lit. c)
provides that: “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
accession when: […] all the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent
may be expressed by that State by means of accession [italics added]”. Two
forms of subsequent agreements under the heading of article 15 qualify for a
(134) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 11”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 153-154, §3.
(135) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 11”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 157-161.
(136) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 14”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 185, §9.
(137) See supra, at the beginning of the “Theory and Practice” section.
(138) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 15”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 199, §6: “[A]rt 15, as adopted, does not contain a
presumption that treaties with no accession clauses are open to the participation of all States.”
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comparison with succession: 1) the subsequent allowance of accession can
take place through an informal amendment (tacit agreement of the
parties)(139), 2) the depositary can also notify the wish of a State to accede to
the treaty. If the parties do not protest, the State can accede(140). The device of
succession is primarily used for universal treaties which contain a provision on
accession. “Succession” can either be viewed as a specific type of “accession”
lato sensu, or as falling outside the scope of the usual modes of expressing
consent to be bound. We will follow the latter option in the next lines.
Applying by analogy the two forms of subsequent agreements of article 15,
lit. c), we can see “succession” as an informal amendment to the treaty. This
tacit agreement of the parties allows the successor State to participate in the
treaty. This can be prompted by the behaviour of the parties inter se, or by
their silence following the depositary notification (see supra the two options
just listed in regard to article 15, lit. c)).
What did the law of treaty teach us? “Succession” is a unilateral act. It is
analogous – but distinct from – formal instruments (accession or ratification).
The salient feature of succession compared to other means of expressing the
consent to be bound is its temporal dimension. Succession only applies to
treaties already in force at the date of independence, it does not qualify as a
means to bring a treaty into force. Succession has a retroactive effect. Unlike
accession, it is not governed by the VCLT, and hardly ever provided for in
treaties (the only known example is found in the 1975 Cocoa Agreement (141)).
8.

Notifications according to various perspectives

Up to now we focused on a theoretical approach (applying general
classifications to notifications). We will now shortly contemplate notifications

(139) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 15”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 206, §26.
(140) F. Hoffmeister, “Article 15”, in: O. Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012), 206, §27.
(141) Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, New
York (1999), 88, §294; Article 71, §4 of the 1975 Cocoa Agreement: “When a territory to which
this Agreement has been extended under paragraph 1 subsequently attains independence, the
Government of that territory may, within 90 days after the attainment of independence,
declare by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it has assumed the
rights and obligations of a Contracting Party to this Agreement. It shall, as from the date of
such notification, be a Contracting Party to this Agreement […]” (United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 1023, 286). The main concern of Article 71 is the Agreement’s territorial application. St.
Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines succeeded to the Cocoa Agreement.
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from the perspective of various fields and actors of international law. After
that, we will contemplate notifications “from the inside”, focusing on their
intrinsic features.
A technical and ambiguous aspect of notifications in relation to customary
law needs further explanations. In Pellet and Daillier’s handbook, autonomous
acts are the ones whose validity is not based on a customary norm (here, the
purpose of such a customary norm would be to enumerate the requirements
of a valid notification and its effect)(142). Notifications are on two different
levels in respect of customary law (this follows from the form/substance
dichotomy). The form of notification is not regulated by customary law (yet?),
but part of the content may well be based upon customary law. It is the case
when a notification refers to “valid principles of international law” and thus
acknowledges the automatic succession rule. Notifications of succession,
although not governed by customary law, may indicate the opinio iuris of a
State regarding automatic succession, and thus attest (or create) a customary
norm.
The perspective of treaty law has been dealt with before. Essentially,
notifications are to be seen as a formal instrument, akin to (but distinct from)
accession.
From the actors’ perspective, we can individualise the successor State, the
depositary (irrespective of whether a State or an International organization
discharges this duty), and other States parties(143).
A general notification is the most readily available means for a successor
State to make its intention(144) publicly known. It has the advantage of allowing
a single declaration listing all the treaties subject to succession. The addressee
is the depositary, who has the obligation to then communicate the notification
to other States parties. General notifications allow the Successor State to
condense various steps of the succession process taken at the internal level. At
once, the successor State acts on the international level congruent to what has
been decided internally (decision of the legislative branch regarding treaties,
the fate of reservations made by the predecessor State, the list of treaties
(142) N. Quoc Dinh, et al., Droit International Public, 5th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J. (1994), 354-355,
§242.
(143) If the Predecessor State is of any relevance in this constellation, it is as an “other States
parties”.
(144) His intention to succeed following its decision, or following his duty to abide to
international law.
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subjected to succession, the date of succession, etc.). From this standpoint, a
notification is an addition of peculiar things, an agglomerate of opinions and
decisions taken by the Successor State. It shows no unity, but is made at once.
It is both technical (required step for the depositary) and political/juridical (a
decision, or an assessment of what international law commands to do).
A notification (specific or general) is a required step for the depositary:
absent such a declaration, it will not let the Successor State participate to the
treaties potentially subjected to succession. To the depositary, it absolutely
does not matter whether the Successor State is pro or against automatic
succession, or if the Successor State issues a general or a specific notification.
Up to now, it is only upon notification that depositaries act(145). Notifications
are “constituent” for depositaries. We can speculate on the reaction of the
Successor State and other States parties if the depositary, without any
notification, decided to list the Successor State as a party. Probably it would
not prompt reactions from the other States parties (in the case of a
multilateral treaty). On the other hand, this action could raise protests from
the Successor State and put it against automatic succession(146).
Do notifications matter to other States parties? At first glance the answer is
no, since they hardly ever protested such notifications. They are (again) akin to
an accession to them, and they mainly fulfil a goal of information. It has been
noted that other States parties are only an incidental addressee of
notifications(147). Successor States, apart in the case of succession to bilateral
or plurilateral treaties, do not directly deal with other States parties. Their
hypothetical protests will be directed towards the depositary(148).
(145) This is connected to the depositary’s duty of article 77, §1, lit. d) VCLT: “The functions of
a depositary […] comprise in particular: […] examining whether the signature or any
instrument, notification or communication relating to the treaty is in due and proper form”
(italics added). Until now, the “due and proper form” of succession to a treaty is a notification
that clearly identifies the treaty subjected to succession.
(146) Depositaries are not inclined to act on their own on such delicate topics. In the end, it
would even damage the likeliness of a large participation into multilateral treaties since the
Successor State would be opposed to the succession (formal protest, or withdrawal from the
treaty). Although the automatic listing of successor States as participant by the depositary
would constitute a clear evidence of the automatic succession rule, it could also prompt a
strong opposition to the rule.
(147) It is the depositary’s duty to notify the other States parties (article 77, §1, lit. e) VCLT).
(148) Since there is no direct communication between the Successor State and the other
States parties, the depositary serves as a middleman. Hence, protests will be directed against
the depositary, not towards the Successor State. The adverse other State party will for
instance put forward the fact that the successor is not “a State” or that the succession
mechanism cannot apply.
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9.

A perspective “from the inside”

Assuming that it is possible to temporarily set aside the theoretical
surrounding of notifications, what is the core characteristic and the raison
d’être of general notifications of succession? and what can be learned thereof?
Notifications are a formalization of the process of succession. The common
elements are the restatement of the decision taken at the internal level, the
kind and list of treaties concerned (already in force, ratified but not yet in
force, only signed), the fate of reservations, and the date of succession. It is
also a “positive” act: States only list the treaties they want to subject to
succession. The other treaties are left aside because they fall within the scope
of an exception to succession(149), are bilateral treaties (which generally
prompt direct negotiations with the partner State), or are treaties which the
State does not want to be part of. It may even be that the successor State
records are incomplete and that a “lost” or “forgotten” treaty avoids
succession(150).
The references to public international law are not very conclusive. They are
sometimes totally lacking (Croatia), or very loose (“undertakes faithfully to
perform and carry out [international treaties]”; Serbia and Montenegro,
Montenegro). When they are more specific, they refer to “valid”, or “relevant
principles of international law” (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Macedonia). The
most specific reference is in the Slovenian declaration, it contains the following
extracts: “in consideration of customary international law” and “[Slovenia] in
principle acknowledges the continuity of treaty rights and obligations”. This
clear stance in favour of international law and automatic succession is however
balanced by the fact that Slovenia did not submit all predecessor treaties to
succession, but chose to explicitly subject them to legal examination prior to

(149) Along with the two safeguards clauses of article 34, §2 VCST, we have to list “desuetude”
as a ground of non-succession. See the Macedonian and Slovenian declarations: “[s]ince it is
likely that certain treaties may have lapsed by the date of independence of Slovenia or may be
outdated, it seems essential that each treaty be subjected to legal examination”
(https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr). Desuetude stricto sensu is the
lapse of a treaty by the mere passage of time, this hypothesis is controverted and quite
exceptional (see: A. Vamvoukos, Termination of Treaties in International Law, Oxford,
Clarendon Press (1985), 300-302). Here, the words “lapsed” and “outdated” certainly
encompass the lex posterior derogat anteriori principle enshrined in article 30 VCLT
(application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter). See also note n° 100.
(150) This is also why the UN Secretary-General is disposed to help the successor State by
gathering a list of treaties binding on the predecessor State.
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issuing a notification of succession(151) (it is no “blind” succession). In the end,
it does not matter to the depositary since it acts only if the treaty subjected to
succession is distinctively identified. The reference (or absence thereof) to
international law is not an essential requirement of notifications of succession.
References of this nature are worth for assessing customary international law,
but are of no use to the depositary.
Be that as it may, since the general notifications contain a list of treaties,
the reference to customary law only applies to these treaties. To exaggerate,
one State could well refer to customary law and subject fifty treaties to
succession and another successor State from the same predecessor subject
two hundred treaties to succession without any reference to public
international law whatsoever. For example, among the successor States of ExYugoslavia, the numbers of treaties subjected to succession vary from 155
(Macedonia) to 202 (Serbia and Montenegro). Overall, in the Yugoslavian case
there are no clear-cut differences between States referring to international law
and those who do not(152), there are even no differences between the one
State that issued specific notifications compared to those who issued general
notifications(153). However, in the U.S.S.R. and Sudan cases, the numbers of
treaties subjected to succession are substantially lower than in cases where a

(151) “[s]ince it is likely that certain treaties may have lapsed by the date of independence of
Slovenia or may be outdated, it seems essential that each treaty be subjected to legal
examination.
The Government of the Republic of Slovenia has examined 55 multilateral treaties for which
[the Secretary-General of the United Nations] …has assumed the depositary functions. … [T]he
Republic of Slovenia considers to be bound by these treaties by virtue of succession to the SFR
Yugoslavia in respect of the territory of the Republic of Slovenia…
Other treaties, for which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the depositary and
which had been ratified by the SFRY, have not yet been examined by the competent authorities
of the Republic of Slovenia. [The Government of the Republic of Slovenia will inform the
Secretary-General] …on [its] …position concerning these treaties in due course.” Italics added
(https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_en). Macedonia took a similar
stance: “[c]omme il est vraisemblable que certains traités sont devenus caducs ou obsolètes,
chacun
fera
l’objet
d'un
examen
juridique
puis
d’une
notification.”
(https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_fr). Slovakia and the Czech Republic
also did something similar (unfortunately, the French and English versions of the notification
differ).
(152) Croatia did not refer to international law and succeeded to 184 treaties, Slovenia did
refer to it and succeeded to 182 treaties.
(153) Bosnia and Herzegovina subjected 180 treaties to succession through specific
notifications only.
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general notification was issued(154). In this framework, we can draw the
conclusion that once a predecessor State has decided to succeed to treaties, it
does not really matter whether it bases this decision on international law or
not.
In the end, general notifications do not appear as a very formal or codified
instrument. There is a great variety of length and content without any bearing
on the succession to treaties. The list of treaties annexed to the general
notification is central to the succession process. It determines the scope of the
succession and avoids to the Successor State the trouble to issue a notification
for each treaty. It thus acts like an agglomerate of all specific notifications.
The second important factor after the list of treaties is the date of
succession. The peculiarity of succession compared to accession or ratification
is that it has a retroactive effect, hence the importance of specifying the date
of succession.
The third element is the (sometimes specified) fate of the reservations,
objections, and declarations made by the Predecessor State. The 2011 work of
the International Law Commission on reservations to treaties provides useful
guidance if the successor State does not specify its intentions(155). In a nutshell,
the rule provides that the Successor State is bound by its predecessor’s
reservations, it is only allowed to narrow the scope of application of the
reservations(156). Nevertheless, the depositaries’ practice may not always
follow this rule.
In this respect, we will briefly turn to the practice of Switzerland.
Switzerland acts as a depositary for 79 international Conventions and had to
deal with successor States more than once. The initial practice of Switzerland
was to presume that the Successor State succeeded without the
reservations(157). It then changed: “[Switzerland’s practice] consiste, chaque

(154) See the chart and numbers supra (section: “The Practice”). On the other hand,
Montenegro, who did subject almost all of its predecessor's multilateral treaties to succession
(around 340 treaties), did not refer to public international law at all.
(155) See Points 5 to 5.5 of the said work: ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2011), vol. II(2), 25-30.
(156) Point 5.1.2, §2: “A successor State which is a party to a treaty as the result of a uniting or
separation of States may neither formulate a new reservation nor widen the scope of a
reservation that is maintained.” ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission (2011), vol. II(2), 26.
(157) “Pratique de la Suisse en tant qu’Etat dépositaire. Réserves aux traités dans le contexte
de la succession d’Etats”, 2007.17 Jurisprudence des Autorités Administratives de la
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fois que cela s’avère nécessaire, à inviter l’auteur de la déclaration de
succession à préciser s’il reprend ou non à son compte les réserves et
déclarations formulées par son prédécesseur”(158). By only drawing the
predecessor State’s attention to the fate of reservations, Switzerland acts in
accordance with its depositary’s obligation of impartiality(159). The most recent
declaration (Montenegro, 2006) is quite short and is limited to the three
elements aforementioned (list of treaties, date, and fate of reservations). Prior
to the general notification, it is possible that as a depositary the UN Secretary
General asks the successor State about (or draws his attention to) the fate of
reservations(160).
Aside from the abovementioned three essential elements, States
sometimes encompass treaties not yet in force, or treaties signed, but subject
to ratification in their general notification(161) (articles 36 and 37(162) VCST).
Confédération, 330 (available online at: https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/droitfederal/jurisprudence-autorites-administratives-confederation/2007.html).
(158) “Pratique de la Suisse en tant qu’Etat dépositaire. Réserves aux traités dans le contexte
de la succession d’Etats”, 2007.17 Jurisprudence des Autorités Administratives de la
Confédération, 330. It is further stated that if the successor State wants to make new
reservations, Switzerland would suggest to access, rather than to succeed, to the treaty (“Pour
la Suisse, il n’appartient pas au dépositaire de trancher la question de savoir si un Etat
successeur peut être admis à formuler de nouvelles réserves au moment de la notification de
sa déclaration de succession. Si la Suisse, dans l’exercice de son rôle de dépositaire, venait à
être confrontée à une telle question, elle se mettrait en rapport avec l’Etat successeur pour le
rendre attentif aux difficultés que ses nouvelles réserves seraient susceptibles de soulever et
lui suggérerait d’envisager la possibilité d’emprunter la voie de l’adhésion pour devenir partie
à un traité, auquel cas sa déclaration de succession pourrait être retirée ou simplement
considérée comme nulle et non avenue.” still on page 330). This opinion of the Swiss Federal
department of foreign affairs dates back to 2007, prior to the ILC Guide on reservations (2011).
(159) This obligation is to be linked with articles 76, §2 and 77 VCLT: “Art 77 underlines the
administrative nature of the depositary functions and clearly limits the discretionary powers of
the depositary. Particularly in the context of its duty to examine signatures, instruments,
notifications and communications, the depositary can only take preliminary decisions and has
to leave the final decision to the States concerned.” (H. Tichy, P. Bittner, “Article 77”, in: O.
Dörr, K. Schmalenbach (ed.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Berlin, Springer (2012),
1310, §1). Absent a declaration of the successor, and depending on the stage of development
of customary law, the depositary cannot take for granted that the predecessor reservations
are binding on the successor State. Moreover, hindering the successor State to make new
reservations may prove counterproductive if accession with the same reservations is possible.
(160) In a 2006 statement, Serbia, as the continuator State of Serbia and Montenegro (article
35 VCST), confirmed that the reservations were still binding. Per se, such a statement is
absolutely useless since there was no doubt that Serbia was the successor State. So, it is
probable that this statement has been prompted by a demand of the UN Secretary-General
(see the statement, available on the UN website under the heading “Serbia”:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_en).
(161)
The
Czech
Republic
and
Slovakia
did
so,
see:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_en.
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In the UN framework, general notifications have another effect. Since they
are communicated to all UN members, the international community at large is
aware of the succession process. In contrast, specific notifications are only
communicated to other States parties. General notifications are thus a good
way for successor States to elaborate on their succession process (substance of
the declaration of independence, decision of the parliament). Here, the
notifications’ informative purpose is used by successor States.
Overall, general notifications assume a role of centralising the succession
process. The required key elements are not numerous, but they help the
depositary to receive them all at once. The key elements are constituent in
nature: treaties are not subjected to succession by the depositary if it does not
receive the notification. Aside from these elements, States are free to add
details on their succession process or on their insight on customary law in the
field of State succession.
10. Conclusion
Let us briefly summarize the key elements in this article. Notifications of
succession in respect of treaties already in force are outside the scope of part
four of the VCST. In spite of that, notifications of succession are widely used by
successor States. Notifications are one of the five traditional unilateral juridical
acts. The five cases presented in the “practice” section show that seven out of
twenty successor States chose to address a general notification of succession
to the UN as depositary. Notifications overwhelmingly encompassed
multilateral treaties. The practice also shows the different wordings used by
successor States when they referred to international law. The confrontation of
theory with practice set out in section 6 reveals the difficulty to put
notifications under a single heading: depending on the customary nature (or
not) of notifications, opposed classifications could be relevant. In the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the provisions relating to “ratification”, and
especially to “accession”, offer interesting insights on “succession”. The last
two sections investigating various points of view evidenced that notifications
address several topics at the same time, they are in no way limited to a single
purpose. On the contrary: one of the key aspects of notifications is their
multidimensional nature.
(162) The VCST does not provide for a notification in the case of article 37, but in practice this
is what happens. Article 38 (notifications) only relates to article 36 VCST.
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Glancing back at these elements, we are aware that the present analysis of
notifications looks more like a maze than an example of clarity(163).
Nevertheless, as a few elements stand out, it is possible to sketch some salient
features of notifications.
First and foremost, we state that “notification of succession” is a category in
itself. It has its owns conditions, features, effects, authors, addresses, and
beneficiaries. When a State succeeds to a treaty, irrespective of the use of a
specific or general notification, the depositary accepts the instrument. The
effect of a notification of succession is reflected in the creation of a formal
instrument, namely “succession”. Succession is akin to, but different from,
ratification and accession. Succession is defined as the means used by
separating successor States to participate in their predecessor’s treaties that
were already in force at the time of succession of States. “Succession” has
developed outside the framework of both the VCST and the VCLT, “succession”
was created by the practice of the early nineties.
Second, notifications of succession resist a straightforward analysis. For
each actor, they have their own meaning. They are used as a channel by the
Successor State, who can express its position on public international law
(acceptance and limits of the automatic succession principle). The depositary is
bound by the content of notifications, it cannot subject to succession treaties
not included in a notification. To the other States parties general notifications
are like a public declaration, they announce which State subjects which
treaties to succession.
By gathering multiple viewpoints together, as we did (theory, practice,
treaty law, customary law, perspective from the depositary, the successor
State, other States parties) we can affirm that notifications are not onedimensional, but multidimensional. This process also helped highlight the most
characteristic features of succession. General notifications gather
heterogeneous, unrelated elements. Accordingly, they can be read on different
levels, and alternative readings are unavoidable.

(163) It accurately reflects the author’s uncertainties.
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خالفة الدول فيما يتعلق بالمعاهدات
واإلخطارات :نهج االختناق
السيد أيميريك هيش
باحث دكتوراه -جامعة نوشاتيل ،سويرسا

ملخص البحث باللغة العربية:
يف هذه األيام ،يتعلق موضوع خالفة الدول من منظار املعاهدات الدولية أساسا
بتفكك الدول وانفصال أقاليم منها .وفقا التفاقية فيينا املوقعة عام  1978خلالفة
الدول يف املعاهدات ،تلزم معاهدات السلف تلقائيا الدولة اخللف (املادة  34من
االتفاقية املذكورة) .من الناحية العملية ،ال تصبح الدول اخللف ملزمة رسميا إال
بعد إصدارها إشعارا باخلالفة .باستثناء تقديم االخطار ،ال تدرج جهة اإليداع الدول
اخللف كطرف يف أي التزام.
بناء عىل ما تقدم ،هتدف هذه املقالة إىل تسليط الضوء عىل مركزية اإلخطار يف
عملية اخلالفة .ونظرا ألمهية الدور الذي تلعبه اإلخطارات ،يصبح من املفيد التدقيق
والغوص يف مفهوم اإلخطارات والغاية منها .وبالتايل تتناول املقالة مواضيع متعددة
وتطرح األسئلة التالية ،هبدف بناء صورة أوضح وأدق عن العالقة بني اإلشعارات
والدول اخللف فيام يتعلق باملعاهدات :ما اإلخطار؟ ما االعتبارات النظرية املتعلقة
هبا؟ كيف تستخدم الدول اخللف اإلخطارات؟ هل من داللة لقانون املعاهدات فيام
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خيص إشعارات اخلالفة؟ هل حتكم القوانني العرفية اإلخطارات؟ كيف تنظر الدول
اخللف وجهات اإليداع والدول األطراف يف املعاهدات إىل اإلشعارات؟
يف هناية املقالة ،سنكون قادرين عىل حتديد خصائص إخطارات اخلالفة .ومن
خالل ذلك ،سنقدم أدوات حتليلية مفيدة لتقييم إخطارات اخلالفة املقبلة ،فضال عن
خالفة الدول فيام يتعلق باملعاهدات عموما.
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